ORGANIZED CRIME-RACKETERRING-RICO INTERPRrrED AS REQUIRING BENEFIT TO FLOW FROM ILLEGAL ACTIVITY TO ITS

Associ-

BusINEsS-United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir.
1981).

ATED

Organized crime has an enormous impact on American commerce.' Its widespread dimensions and its ability to escape detection,
investigation, and prosecution prompted Congress to pass the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA). 2 In an attempt to eradi3
cate the infiltration of racketeering activities in American business,
Congress formulated Title IX of OCCA, the Racketeering Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Statute (RICO). 4 The purpose of the
statute is to attack in depth the activities of racketeers who have long
remained immune from prosecution. 5 It does so by increasing the
scope of federal jurisdiction over racketeering offenses, 6 creating an
effective evidence gathering process,7 establishing harsh penalties, 8
and imposing forfeiture of all business interests tainted by racketeering activities to permit the rehabilitation of the corrupted business
I See

McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S.30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil

Liberties?, 46 NoTRE DAME LAW. 55, 58-60 (1970). Senator McClellan, one of the primary
promoters of the Bill, defended the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
84 Stat. 922 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C.), by citing statistics of organized
crime's involvement in business: of one hundred and thirteen major crime figures, ninety-eight
were involved in one-hundred fifty-nine businesses; racketeers control and own nationwide
recognized brand name products, a large hotel chain, a bank with assets of $70 to $90 million,
and a $20 million per year laundry business. McClellan stated that they dominate businesses
through violence and hundreds of racketeer created bankruptcy schemes. He concluded by
writing: "This is just a sampling. I could go on at length in this fashion, but I think the necessary
point has been made." McClellan, supra, at 142.
' Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C.).
3 See id. at 922-23 (Statement of Findings and Purpose).
4 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976).
5 See McClellan, supra note 1, at 60. McClellan states that LaCosa Nostra obtains dismissals or acquittals twice as often on charges against them as offenders unconnected with a
Mafia family. Certain individuals achieved this immunity five times or more, and the chieftains
are "insulated" from the law and the judicial process. Id.
6 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976). RICO permits federal law enforcement agencies to
prosecute under what had been until then specifically state offenses as long as there is a
connection between the enterprise and interstate or foreign commerce. Id. § 1962. The United
States Supreme Court has stated that RICO imposes no limitations on the state criminal justice
prosecutions; the states remain free to define and prosecute crimes within their jurisdictions
regardless of the RICO prosecutions. United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2524, 2530 n.9 (1981).
7 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1966-1968 (1976). Some of the tools provided by the statute for the
Attorney Ceneral in a RICO prosecution are: a certificate to expedite court hearings and
decisions, id. § 1966; an ability to open or close the trial to the public at the discretion of the
court, id. § 1967; the use of a "civil investigative demand" for information and documents
instead of having to arrange for a grand jury subpoena, id. § 1968; and, racketeering investigators appointed as needed to investigate and prosecute RICO violations, id.
8 See id. §§ 1963-1964. See note 24 infra for a discussion of RICO penalties.
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whenever possible.9 In short, the legislature intended to eliminate
the influence and control of racketeers from interstate and foreign
commerce.' 0 But the effectiveness of what the legislature accomplished is questionable in light of a recent decision, United States v.
Webster," in which the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
applied an extremely narrow interpretation of the statutory language
of RICO.
The operative provision of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962,12 prohibits
four types of racketeering corruption: (a) the investment of funds
acquired through "a pattern of racketeering activity" in the acquisition, establishment, or operation of an "enterprise," 13 (b) the acquisition of an "enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity,"' 14 (c)
the operation and conduct of an "enterprise's affairs" through "a
pattern of racketeering activity," 15and (d) a conspiracy to commit the
prohibited acts.16 The important terms of this provision are defined
O See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976).
10Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23 (State-

ments of Findings and Purpose).
" 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981).
" 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
" 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976) states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt.. . to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
Id. The statute specifically exempts purchases of securities on the open market which do not
amount "to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class" of stock. Id.
14 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly,
any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
Id.
Is 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976) states: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to
violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section." See generally Note,
Elliot v. United States: Conspiracy Law and the judicial Pursuit of Organized Crime through
RICO, 65 VA. L. Rzv. 109 (1978).
See also United States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), in which an attorney
charged as a conspirator argued that RICO was not intended to be used against financial
advisers who were not principals in the racketeering activity. His restrictive interpretation of the
statute was rejected by the court. Since the court found sufficient evidence of the attorney's
knowledge of the illegal source of the investment funds, it supported the indictment and ordered
a trial on the merits.
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in 18 U.S.C. § 1961.1 7 18 "Racketeering activity" is not limited to
"organized crime" alone, thus, there is no need under the statute to
prove this particular status.' 9 Rather, the statute attacks specifically
enumerated behavioral offenses punishable by imprisonment of more

than one year.20 The statute, however, only provides for conviction
of those racketeering activities that specifically affect an "enterprise."

An "enterprise" is defined as "any individual, partnership, corporation or association," regardless of whether or not it is a "legal entity,"
so long as it is an association "in fact"'2 that is engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce. 22 The illegal acts must be conducted through" 'a
pattern of racketeering activity' [which] requires at least two acts of
24
racketeering" within the last ten years.2 3 The punitive sections of

37 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976). RICO has been unsuccessfully challenged as being unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547, 548-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), relying in
part upon Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), in which the court determined that
merely being "reputed" to be a member of organized crime was not a violation of RICO. An
indictment and conviction under RICO requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a specifically enumerated criminal activity which establishes a pattern of racketeering activity. Thus,
there was no violation of due process because the statute and its penalties were not unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous. Id. Accord, United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 442 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820 (1977), where the court stated that the test to determine
whether the statute is void for vagueness is whether it "conveys an adequate warning as applied
in a specific situation." The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. Id.
11 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976). In United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1095-96
(E.D. Pa. 1979), the court found that the status of organized crime was "elusive." Thus, the
court interpreted the statute as attacking patterns of illegal behavior so that the state need not
prove that the defendant was a member of organized crime. Id. See also McClellan, supra note
1, at 144. The Senator emphasized that the danger of any criminal being unfairly indicted under
a statute which has as its basic thrust the elimination of organized crime is minimized. The
statute requires not only a criminal offense listed in section 1961(1), but also the other elements
enumerated, i.e., a pattern of racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5), and an involvement in
interstate business, id. § 1962(a)-(c).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976).
Id. Racketeering activity is defined as "any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs
which is chargeable under state law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year."
Id. § 1961(I)(A).
21 Id. § 1961(4). Whether or not the RICO statutes would support indictments against
racketeering activities which influence illegitimate as well as legitimate enterprises was an issue
which divided the circuit courts of appeals for years. In a recent United States Supreme Court
case, United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981), the Court determined that any enterprise, legitimate or illegitimate, can be the basis of an indictment and conviction under RICO.
Id. at 2527. See text accompanying note 45 infra.
2
22 18 U.S.C. § 196 (a)-(c) (1976). This requisite connection between the enterprise and
interstate or foreign commerce applies only to the enterprise and not to the racketeering activity
itself. United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1097-98 (E.D. Pa. 1979). That Congress has
the power to regulate intrastate commerce which affects interstate commerce finds support in
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) and U.S. CoNs-r. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. See also note 6
supra.
- 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976).
24The statute provides that the court may impose a fine of up to $25,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, plus mandatory forfeiture of any interest in the enterprise
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RICO provide strong enforcement mechanisms including fines, im-

forfeiture of tainted business interests, 25 as well as
prisonment, and
28

civil liability.
27
Despite what the legislature believed to be careful drafting of
the language of the statute, and the clearly expressed intent of the
legislature that the RICO "provisions shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes," ' 28 there have been widely divergent
interpretations of the applicability of the statute.2 9 The recent United
State Supreme Court decision in United States v. Turkette 30 settled
one of the controversies which had split the circuit courts of appeals.
The issue concerned the definition of the term "enterprise" 3 1 as it is
used in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 32 The Court acknowledged the legisla-

owned by the individual convicted under section 1962. Id. §§ 1963-1964. Also, that individual is
subject to civil liability in order to permit the rehabilitation of the enterprise's legitimate
functions. Id. The final sections of RICO deal with procedural and investigatory aspects of a
prosecution under the statutes. Id. §§ 1965-1968.
2s Id. §§ 1963-1964. See H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57, reprinted in [1970]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4083. Congressman John Conyers, Jr. strenuously objected
to the forfeiture penalty, claiming that criminal forfeiture had been outlawed by the first
Congress 180 years before RICO was passed. He believed that the potential deprivation of
property was a threat to American business. Id.
26 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976) authorizes civil liability for those convicted under the RICO
provisions in the form of treble damage suits by individuals injured by the racketeering activity.
2. See McClellan, supra note 1, at 57-58. The Senator asserted that the statute had been
carefully drafted to include the best recommendations from numerous crime commissions, bar
associations, the Model Penal Code, and the American Civil Liberties Union. Accord, lannelli v.
United States, 420 U.S. 770, 789 (1975), in which the Court stated that the Organized Crime
Control Act was "a carefully crafted piece of legislation." But cf. United States v. Rubin, 559
F.2d 975, 990 (5th Cir. 1979) (language of section 1962(c) described as "less than pellucid").
23 H.R.'R p. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEws 4007, 4036.
" See e.g., United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afJ'd on other
grounds, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). See also United States v.
Turkette, 101 S.Ct. 2524 (1981); United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
But see United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Mandel, 591
F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds by an equally divided court, 602 F.2d 653 (4th
Cir.), rehearingdenied by an equally divided court, 609 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 951 (1978).
30 101 S.Ct. 2524 (1981).
"' See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976); text accompanying note 21 supra.
32 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). Prior to Turkette there was a split of opinion among the circuit
courts of appeals over whether the RICO statute would support indictments against racketeering
activities which influence illegitimate enterprises as opposed to legitimate enterprises. Compare
United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 525 n.1 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bone, 598
F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977), and United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d
1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974) (all holding that "enterprise" encompasses illegitimate businesses as
well as legitimate businesses) with United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1365 (8th Cir.
1980) ("enterprise" does not encompass illegitimate businesses). See generally Driscoll, United
States v. Sutton: Reining in on Runaway RICO, 42 U. Prr.L. Rzv. 131 (1980); Gorene, United
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tive intent behind RICO and adopted the liberal construction of the
statutory definition, 33 taking the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) at its

34
face value.

In United States v. Turkette, the defendants had been indicted
for participating in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activities, 35 a section 1962(c) prohibited act. The state
proved that the defendants had conspired to rob eighteen pharmacies
in and around Boston, using the same modus operandi for each
crime. 36 They stole and then distributed narcotics with a "high
'street' resale value." 37 The trial court determined that their association was an enterprise, albeit an illegal one, as dictated by the definition given in RICO. 38 The defendants were convicted under section
1962(c),

39

but the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed,

stating that the term "enterprise" could refer only to legitimate enterprises. 40 Therefore, an illegitimate enterprise formed specifically to
commit illegal acts was outside of the scope of RICO, though it was
punishable under other state and federal statutes.41
On the basis of a liberal interpretation of the legislative intent
and the statutory language of RICO, the Supreme Court reversed, 42
finding that the appellate court's reasoning was "flawed" 43 and was

States v. Sutton: The Sixth Circuit Curbs Abuse of RICO, the FederalRacketeering Enterprise
Statute, 28 CrL-v. ST. L. REv. 629 (1979); Note, Elliot v. United States: ConspiracyLaw and the
Judicial Pursuit of Organized Crime Through RICO, 65 VA. L. REv. 109 (1978).
3 See 101 S. Ct. at 2527.
Id. The Court stated that the language of the statute "no more excludes criminal enterprises than it does legitimate ones." Id.
-1 632 F.2d 896, 897 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981). The defendants had also
been convicted of numerous counts of arson and mail fraud. Id. at 909.
35 Id. at 908. The three defendants disengaged the alarm systems and listened to a police
scanner to determine if the police had been alerted. When they were reassured that no alarm had
sounded, they broke into the pharmacies. The three men worked on all the jobs in the same
manner. Id.
37 Id.
38 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976). See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
39 632 F.2d at 898.
40 Id. at 899. The court recognized that this interpretation of "enterprise" was contrary to
the case law of other circuits which had construed the scope of section 1962(c) as including
illegitimate businesses. See United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1039 (1977); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974).
41 632 F.2d at 905-06. The court stated that failure to convict under RICO did not mean that
the criminals could escape punishment altogether. Proper indictments and trials would lead to
convictions since each criminal act enumerated in section 1961(1) was already designated as a
criminal act under state andlor federal statutes. Id.
12 101 S. Ct. at 2527.
13 See id. & n.4. The appellate court had analyzed the various parts of section 1962 and
determined that subsections (a) and (b) were understandable only if the protected enterprise was
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based on "a faulty premise."' 44 The Supreme Court found the lan-

guage of RICO unambiguous and interpreted the definition of enterprise "on its face" to include both legitimate and illegitimate businesses. 45 The Court stated that if Congress had intended to narrow
the scope of the statute, it would have done so by inserting "legitimate" into the definition of "enterprise." 46 It characterized the interpretation adopted by the court of appeals as a departure from, and a
limitation of, the clearly enunciated statutory language. 47 In addition, the Supreme Court found the appellate court's reasoning inadequate .4 Analyzing the language and the structure of section 1961(4),
the Court asserted that it "perceive[d] no uncertainty in the meaning
49
to be attributed to [the definition of 'enterprise'].
A major area of controversy, however, still remains open to
various interpretations by the federal courts. The issue concerns the
proper construction of the phrase "to conduct . .. such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity" 50 contained in section 1962(c). Courts which have liberally construed section 1962(c)
have held that the scope of RICO encompasses any substantial influ-

ence or corruption of business by racketeering, no matter what form

that nexus may take. 5' Other courts have rejected this liberal analysis
"legitimate" business. 632 F.2d at 899. Therefore, under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, see
note 48 infra, it held that section 1962(c) must also refer only to legitimate enterprises or else
"enterprise" would be defined as the "pattern of racketeering" making the statute "internally
redundant." 632 F.2d at 899.
In analyzing the legislative intent behind RICO, the appellate court cited only those phrases
from the statute and its legislative history, id. at 899-903, which concerned the elimination of
organized crime from legitimate enterprises only. The court stated: "Congress wanted to eliminate organized crime. But RICO was only one arm of a broad-based attack." Id. at 903.
" 101 S. Ct. at 2528.
" Id. at 2527.
48 Id.
47Id.

" Id. The appellate court had relied on the rule of ejusdem generis to buttress its opinion
that only legitimate enterprises were protected by RICO. See note 43 supra. The rule of ejusdem
generis (of the same kind or class) is used to assist in difficult statutory constructions. The rule
indicates that "where general words follow a specific enumeration of persons or things, the
general words should be limited to persons or things similar to those specifically enumerated."
101 S. Ct. at 2527. Therefore, according to the appellate court, since the specific enterprises
listed in section 1961(4) were legitimate, the final phrase "any union or group of individuals
associated in fact" must also be limited to enterprises which were legitimate. 632 F.2d at 899.
But since the Supreme Court stated that the rule of ejusdem generiscan only be used when there
is "uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular clause in a statute," the Court found that the
rule is "wholly inapplicable" to the definition of enterprise, which is clear and unambiguous. 101
S. Ct. at 2528.
" 101 S. Ct. at 2528.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
"
See United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), af'd on other grounds,
527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). Stofsky is the most widely cited
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and have applied instead a restrictive interpretation of the statutory
language, as typified in Webster. In that case, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that section 1962(c) makes it incumbent
upon the state to prove not only that a substantial nexus between the
enterprise and the racketeering activities exists, but also that52the effect
of those racketeering activities is to benefit the enterprises.
Defendant Walter R. Webster was the leader of a major drug
distribution network.5 3 Defendant Norma Thompson owned Club
1508 Tavern and Liquor Store. 54 . Together, they managed the club
and used its facilities for the drug operation.5 5 Telephone calls to
their home 56 were automatically transferred to the club through the
telephone call forwarding service. 57 Employees at the club accepted
and relayed telephone calls pertaining to the illegal drug business.58
People waiting for drug deliveries did so on the club premises and
were served drinks by club employees. 59
At trial Webster and Thompson were convicted of violating section 1962(c), in that they participated in the conduct of a legitimate
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering.10 On appeal, Judge
Murnaghan, writing for the court, reversed the lower court decision. 6
He interpreted the statute as requiring that the enterprise itself was
the recipient of the benefit derived from its association with the
racketeering activity.6 2 In this case however, the evidence6 3 proved
decision expounding a liberal construction of the statute. See note 157 infra and accompanying
text.

639 F.2d at 183-86.
51 Id. at 183. The case involved seven defe'ndants in all.
s, id.
id.
Id. Thompson and Webster lived together. Id.
-2

57 Id.

5 Id. It is not stated in the case whether or not these employees knowingly participated in
the drug business and whether or not they were also charged with crimes stemming from their
actions as part of a conspiracy. Id. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
51639 F.2d at 183. The court stated that this occurred "on at least one occasion." Id.
60 Id. at 177. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
61639 F.2d at 186. Other issues which were raised on appeal were the legality of wiretaps
used on the telephones of the Webster-Thompson residence and the club, id. at 177-80; the
constitutionality of the "Kingpin" statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848, (1976), 639 F.2d at 177, 180-82: the
sufficiency of the jury representation, id. at 180; and the trial court decision not to permit
polygraph evidence and not to suppress evidence, id. at 186. In addition, the appellate court
reviewed the sufficiency of evidence against another defendant, Herbert Leon Johnson, id. at
187; and, severance of other defendants from Webster's trial. The appellate court upheld all the
convictions and trial court decisions except the section 1962(c) convictions. Id. at 189.
62 639 F.2d at 185-86. The court stated: "Since the evidence was insufficient to allow a
conclusion that the pattern of racketeering had advanced the purposes of the bar in any way,
Webster's and Thompson's convictions for violating § 1962(c) must be reversed." Id. at 186
(emphasis added).
03 Id. at 183. The court indicated that "the evidence in the case might have sustained charges
under section 1962 subsections (a) and (b)" of the RICO statute. Id. at 183 n.3. See notes 13 & 14
supra and accompanying text.
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only that the racketeering activity was the recipient of the benefit
derived from the manner in which the legitimate enterprise was conducted. 4 Thus, the court adopted the restrictive view 5 of the RICO
statutes, construing them as requiring proof of a flow of benefit from
the criminal acts to the legitimate businesses. 66 Absent proof of that
benefit to the enterprise, the business could not be shown to have
activities and
conducted its affairs through a pattern of racketeering 67
sustained.
be
could
1962(c)
no conviction under section
Although it reversed the convictions, the court acknowledged
that the facts in Webster conformed to the standards of the section
1961 definitions.68 Club 1508 was an "enterprise" because it was a
group of associated people. 69 The narcotics sales were "racketeering70
activities" because they were federal offenses involving narcotics.
There were more than two acts of racketeering within the prescribed
ten year period, thus complying with the requirements to establish "a
pattern of racketeering activity." 71 Yet, in interpreting the statutory
language "to conduct or participate... in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity," 72 the court
focused on the word "through."' 73 Judge Murnaghan rejected the
74
state's contention that no direct benefit to the club need be proven
because "through a pattern of racketeering" 75 should only require
proof of a substantial nexus 76 between the conduct of the affairs of the
legitimate enterprise and the racketeering activity in order to lead to
conviction.

77

The Webster court also rejected the government's assertion that
the decision in United States v. Rubin78 supported the substantial
" 639 F.2d at 184.
Os

See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
639 F.2d at 185.

87Id. The court stated that RICO "should be applied in such a way as to punish where the
racketeering activity advances the nonracketeering business but not where the only relation
between the two consists of benefits which the racketeering activity derives from the nonracketeering enterprise." Id.
U Id. at 183-84.
" Id. at 183.
10Id. at 184. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
1' 639 F.2d at 184. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
7218 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
" 639 F.2d at 184-85.
71 Id. at 184.
75 Id. at 184-85 (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 184. This was the position espoused by the government.
77 Id.
7 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 439 U.S. 810
(1978).
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nexus theory. 79 In that case, appellant Bernard C. Rubin was convicted of embezzling employee welfare plan benefits and other union
funds, and of racketeering under section 1962(c). 80 Rubin proved
that the funds, which resulted from numerous duplicate expense
vouchers, 8' were used to promote union affairs by entertaining management and organizing union drives. 82 The state, however, failed to
assert that there was a flow of benefit to the legitimate enterprise;
and, the trial court's instructions to the jury did not attempt to define
"through," but simply emphasized that it was the obligation of the
state to prove that the defendant participated in the affairs of various
unions "through" two or more embezzlements. 8 3 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed his convictions, finding no reversible error in the lower court's refusal to define "through" as "by means
of" 84 which had been requested by the defendant. The Rubin court
found that the evidence sufficiently proved that Rubin's positions in
the unions were served by the embezzled funds, and benefit to the
enterprise could be assumed.8 5 As such, the evidence supported a
conviction under section 1962(c). 88 The circuit court did not attempt
to define "through" as used in section 1962(c) or to endorse the district
court's definition beyond the simple affirmation that the particular
use of "through," if error, was harmless. 87 The Webster court distinguished the Rubin decision,"" asserting that Rubin concerned only a
narrow point of whether or not section 1962(c) requires a jury instruction to highlight the flow of benefit theory. 89 The Rubin court determined that the use of the word "through" made the jury instruction
sufficient.90 But that decision did not, according to the Webster
court, support the state's substantial nexus theory. 9'
Furthermore, the Webster court considered the legislative approach behind section 1962(c) and determined that RICO was not
639 F.2d at 185.
80 559 F.2d at 978.
'1

81 Id. at 978-79.
82 Id. at 979.
83 Id. at 989-90.
" id. at 990. The language "by means of" was used in United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978), in which the court stated, "IT]he most logical
definitions to ascribe to ['through'] as used in the statute are 'by means of, in consequence of, by
reason of.' "Id. at 851 (quoting BLAcK's LAw DICrIONARY 1652 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)).
" 559 F.2d at 990.
88 Id.
87 Id.
88 639 F.2d at 185.
9 See 559 F.2d at 990.

0 639 F.2d at 185.

91See 559 F.2d at 990.
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designed to attack legitimate businesses which permitted the use of
their resources by racketeering activities, but which derived no benefit
from that interaction.92 According to this interpretation, the situation in which only the illegitimate activity is promoted cannot be
reached by section 1962(c).9 3 Since in the court's opinion the state
failed to prove a flow of benefit to the club because of the increase in
tavern customers occasioned by the availability of narcotics on its
premises,"' the convictions were reversed. 95
To support the flow of benefit theory, the Webster court cited
United States v. Nerone,98 in which the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that the use of a legitimate business as a front for
a racketeering activity was inadequate to sustain a conviction for
conducting the affairs of an enterprise "through" a pattern of racketeering activities.97 In Nerone, the owners of a mobile home park
used a trailer which they owned and maintained on the grounds of
their park for a gambling casino. 98 In the indictment, the state
charged that the affairs of the mobile home park were being conducted through a pattern of racketeering. 99 On appeal, the Nerone
court reversed the convictions obtained under section 1962(c) because
the state had not proven that the mobile home park's affairs were
promoted or "advanced" by the gambling operation. 00 None of the
proceeds from the illegitimate business were channeled into the park
either as an investment or as revenue to pay debts which were owed
by the corporation.' 0 ' Therefore, since no benefit had flowed to the
9,639 F.2d at 184.
9' Id. The court stated:
Only the affairs of the drug dealing enterprise were promoted. Section 1962(c)
simply does not by its language extend to a situation where the racketeering activities
are advanced through the assistance of an enterprise. The statute speaks solely of
conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through racketeering. The evidence shows
only conduct of the racketeering through the enterprise. Conducting the enterprise
through racketeering is plainly not the same as conducting the racketeering through
the enterprise.
Id.
" Id. Judge Murnagham stated: "The prosecution might have attempted to prove that the
business of defendant's bar was improved because people were attracted to it by the availability
on the premises of illicit drugs. Yet it did not do so." Id. (emphasis added). Since no evidence was
explicitly introduced to prove benefit to the tavern, the court refused to assume that the benefit
existed. Id.
Id. at 186.
IS
563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
97 Id. at 851.
00 Id. at 839.

" Id. at 851.
100 Id. at 852.
101Id. at 851.
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enterprise from the racketeering activities, the Nerone court concluded that no violation of section 1962(c) had occurred.1 02 Under
this highly restrictive analysis, the court asserted that there was "a
total want of proof" connecting the racketeering activities to the
affairs of the mobile home park. 0 3 The Webster court adopted the
Nerone court's reasoning and its interpretation of "through" to
04
achieve a similar result.
As additional support for the restrictive interpretation of the
word "through," the Webster court cited United States v.Mandel.05
The defendant, W. Dale Hess, had transferred stock and dividends
from his legitimate business to Governor Mandel as a pay-off for the
governor's participation in a mail fraud scheme.106 The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's acquittal 107 of Hess on this charge stressing that the transfer by Hess to
Mandel of a partnership interest in Hess's business did not influence or
corrupt the legitimate enterprise because Mandel never had any control or managerial role in the business itself.108 The court construed
"through" as requiring proof of a "connection" between the "operation" of the business and the pattern of racketeering. 09 The statute
could not be utilized against an individual who had only used the
income derived from a legitimate business to participate in a racketeering activity. The court stated that to hold otherwise would unfairly subject the legitimate business to the mandatory forfeiture rules

102 Id. The court suggested that had the state indicted the gambling operation instead of the
mobile home park, "[it] would have no difficulty in concluding that the convictions obtained
under such theory are sustainable on the basis of the present record." Id. at 852. It was the
impression of the court that the state had proceeded against the mobile home park rather than
against the gambling operation in an attempt to unfairly invoke the section 1963 forfeiture
provisions of RICO as argued by the defendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976). Thus, the court
refused to invoke the RICO penalties or prohibitions. 563 F.2d at 852.
103563 F.2d at 852. The court stated: "Geographical juxtaposition of the enterprises is
insufficient. "Id.

114639 F.2d at 185.

1-5 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds by an equally divided court, 602 F.2d
653 (4th Cir.), rehearing denied by an equally divided court, 609 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
106Id. at 1376.
107 Id. at 1352 n.3 & 1374. The jury had returned a verdict of guilty on all the RICO charges.
The district court set aside the verdict as it pertained to Hess's conviction under section 1962(c)
and entered a judgment of acquittal. Id. The prosecutor appealed this decision and the appellate
court agreed to hear the appeal. For a detailed discussion on the constitutionality of an appeal by
the government on that judgment, see id. at 1374-75.
108 Id. at 1376,
'09

Id. at 1375.
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of section 1963(a)." 0 Where the bribery and mail fraud schemes
were not connected with the affairs of Hess's legitimate enterprise,
there could be no conviction for conducting the business's affairs
through racketeering."'
What is applicable to the Mandel fact pattern, however, is inapplicable to Webster. Although the Webster court cites Mandel as
supportive of the restrictive approach to RICO, 112 that analysis of the
Mandel court's reasoning is inaccurate. An application of the Mandel
court's approach to the Webster fact pattern would sustain convictions, not acquittals, of both Webster and Thompson. In Mandel, the
court stressed the fact that at no time did the governor have any
control of, or managerial role in, the legitimate enterprise owned by
Hess." 3 Only the proceeds of that business were involved in the
racketeering activity; at no time were the facilities, the premises, the
employees, or the inventory of Hess's legitimate enterprise engaged in
the racketeering activity. Webster and Thompson, on the other hand,
owned and "operated" their club." 4 They used the telephones, the
premises, the employees, and the liquor inventory, actively corrupting
the legitimate business to further the more profitable illegal drug
business." s This conduct of the affairs of the enterprise was certainly
not the purely "passive"" 6 involvement considered in Mandel, but
rather the active participation in the conduct of the affairs of the
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activities considered by
the legislature in its attack on racketeering, and against which the
RICO statute was devised.
The court in Mandel nowhere suggests that benefit must flow to
the enterprise as a result of the racketeering activity. The Webster
court, however, cites the Mandel court as saying that the word
"through" must be given meaning or else any use of legitimate income
in a racketeering activity would be a violation of section 1962(c). Also,
the Mandel court stated that Congress did not mean "to sweep so
broadly.""17 By using only these two sentences, the Webster court
11o

Id. The court stated:

Without the word "through," anyone who used income from a legitimate business to
participate in racketeering activity would be guilty of a violation of § 1962(c). We do
not believe Congress meant to sweep so broadly, especially in light of the mandatory
forfeiture penalities for a § 1962 violation.
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976)).
"1 591 F.2d at 1375.
112 639 F.2d at 185.
"'
"'

591 F.2d at 1376.
639 F.2d at 183.

16

Id.
591 F.2d at 1376.

"'

639 F.2d at 185 (quoting Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1375).

11
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implies that the Mandel court's meaning for the word "through" is in
agreement with the Webster court's flow of benefit theory.1 18 Ac-

cording to the Mandel decision, however, "through" means participation in or control of the operation of the affairs of the legitimate
business, 19 not the flow of benefit in any particular direction. The
Mandel decision does not support the restrictive interpretation of the
20
statute.
The RICO convictions in Webster should have been sustained
even under the restrictive interpretation of Nerone. The Webster
court maintained that the state could have, but did not prove any
benefit flowing to the club from the use of its facilities by the racke-

teering activity.' 2 ' But it is difficult to believe that all of the facts
presented by the state concerning the use of the tavern as a drug site
and the increased traffic in the bar occasioned thereby were not found
sufficient to support a finding that some benefit did flow to the
club. 122 In effect, the very survival of the Club 1508 might have been
based on its involvement with the drug business. The club was not
even a profit-making venture. 2 3 Why would Webster and Thompson keep it in operation if not for its assistance with their criminal
conduct? Without that, the club might very well have been closed.
I's
639

F.2d at 185.

119 591 F.2d at 1375-76. The Mandel court found that the defendant could not be convicted
under section 1962(c) since a transfer of shares in a business as a pay-off was not specifically
outlawed by section 1962. Also, it stated: "[T]ransfer of an interest in a business is the antithesis
of operating it." Id. at 1376. Additionally, the business was not used as a front for the racketeering activity. The criminal activity was unconnected to the operation of the business; therefore,
the business was not "a racketeer influenced organization proscribed by § 1962(c)." Id.
'2
It should be noted that although its language clearly reflects a liberal interpretation of
section 1962(c), the Mandel court stated that it followed the definition of the word "through"
used by the Nerone court: "by means of, in consequence of, by reason of," 591 F.2d at 1375-76
(quoting Nerone, 563 F.2d at 851). But, the Mandel court never referred to a flow of benefit,
and the quotation selected from Nerone does not include any reference to benefit, or to promotion or advancement, words used frequently both in Nerone and Webster. The Mandel court also
differentiated its case from the decision in United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), ajf'd on other grounds, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 819 (1976),
which is the foremost case representing a liberal interpretation of RICO. See note 157 infra.
Nevertheless, since "by means of, in consequence of, by reason of" were used in Mandel in
conjunction with control of or participation in the operation of the business, the avoidance of the
benefit-promotion-advancement theory was purposeful. Had the court meant to restrict the
application of section 1962(c), it could easily have done so by stating that since the legitimate
business did not benefit from the racketeering activity, no conviction was warranted. Yet, the
court couched its decision in terms of a connection between the racketeering activities and the
operation and control of the enterprise, not in terms of its benefit and promotion. 591 F.2d at
1375-76. The Mandel decision cannot be used to support a restrictive statutory interpretation
when it reflects such a liberal construction.
121639 F.2d at 184. See note 94 supra and accompanying text, and note 124 infra.
"1
See 639 F.2d at 184.
123Id.
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This probability, coupled with the fact that the premises, facilities,
employees, and inventory were actively used, 24 should lead to the
justifiable conclusion that the club did receive an important benefit
from its association with racketeering activities. As was shown in
Rubin, despite the state's failure to assert the theory that benefit
flowed from the illegitimate racketeering activity to the legitimate
enterprise, the court may find that the flow of benefit existed if that
finding is supported by sufficient evidence.1 25 Of course, each element of every criminal offense must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.16 That standard was met by the evidence presented.
It is also probable that since the enterprise was not a profit-making venture,'27 at least one of its functions was to serve as a front for
the illegal drug operation. Although the Nerone court maintained that
a business used as a cover for an illegal racketeering business activity
was not within the grasp of section 1962(c),128 this restrictive interpretation is in direct conflict with the scope of the statute as expressed
even in its name-Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizationsand should not have been relied upon by the Webster court. What
could conceivably be more influenced or corrupted by racketeering
than a business whose purpose is to front for a narcotics network?
Many weaknesses exist in the Webster court's interpretation of
RICO as it applies to the fact pattern. Both the Webster and Nerone
courts stated that they were construing the term "through," 29 but in
fact they were using the phrase "to conduct ... such enterprise's

'12Id. at 183. The facts given in the case are unclear as to whether "club-owned drinks"
meant that the drinks served were sold to the customer, or were complimentary.
"1 559 F.2d at 990. The appellate court stated that the trial court's instruction which used the
word "through" without defining it conveyed the requisite nexus between the legitimate business
and the proscribed activities. Id. The court then found that despite the failure of the trial judge
to assert the requirement that the embezzled funds benefited the union, a conviction could be
sustained because sufficient evidence to that effect had been introduced for the court to assume
that benefit. Id.
In light of the decision in Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1374-76, a prior Fourth Circuit case, and the
split of opinion between the circuit courts of appeals on the interpretation of section 1962(c), it
may have been prosecutorial error in Webster not to have anticipated and accommodated this
restrictive analysis by stressing the benefits of attracting drug customers to the tavern rather than
attempting to convince the court on appeal that it should make a finding that the benefit existed.
ItO Lilienthal v. United States, 97 U.S. 237 (1877).
,2'639 F.2d at 184.
IA 563 F.2d at 851. The Nerone court stated that the government had shown that the illegal
gambling casino was operated "through the cover of a legitimate enterprise." Nevertheless, that
form of racketeering involvement in an enterprise was not deemed by the court to be actionable
under RICO. Id.
"' Webster, 639 F.2d at 185; Nerone, 563 F.2d at 851-52.
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affairs"1 30 interchangeably with the words to "promote," "improve,"
and "advance"' 3' 1 the affairs of the enterprise. These definitions for
the word "conduct" are not supported either in the statute 32 or in the
statement of legislative intent. 33 And even though the definition of
"through" was interpreted by the Nerone court as "by means of, in
consequence of, by reason of,"

34 those

definitions do not mean for the

advancement of, or for the benefit of 135 the enterprise. Yet, both
courts use "through" in that manner. This artificial concept of profit

or benefit should not by judicial determination be equated to "means,

...consequence, . . . [or] reason."136 If Congress had intended to

use either "conduct" or "through" in such a unique fashion, it would
have so indicated in section 1961, the definition section of RICO.
Every term used in the statute having a meaning other than its obvious, everyday definition was included in that section. 3 7 To hinge
the entire significance of RICO on a peculiar explanation of common

words seems to be merely an excuse used by the court to defend its
failure to apply the statute as it was devised and to thwart its intended
scope. What could be more clear than the legislative intent "to seek
the eradication of" racketeering in American commerce, and to "liberally construe" 1 38 the statute designed specifically to do just that?
A much more realistic approach to the scope of RICO was expounded in United States v. Stofsky, 39 which adopted a liberal inter1- 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
M Webster, 639 F.2d at 184; Nerone, 563 F.2d at 851-52.
I" See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976).
1' See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23
(Statement of Findings and Purpose). The dictionary defines "conduct" as "to manage: direct:
lead; have direction; carry on; regulate; do business," not as to promote, advance, or benefit.
BLAcK's LAW DICrIONARY 268 (5th ed. 1979).
134563 F.2d at 851 (quoting BLAcx's LAW DICTIONARY 1652 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)).
U~sNerone, 563 F.2d at 851; Webster, 639 F.2d at 184-86.
38 Nerone, 563 F.2d at 851; Webster, 639 F.2d at 185.
137 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976) defines the following words: racketeering activity, state, person,
enterprise, pattern of racketeering activity, unlawful debt, racketeering investigator, racketeering investigation, documentary material, and Attorney Ceneral. Each definition is given the
broadest interpretation possible. See notes 20, 21 & 23 supra and accompanying text.
This reasoning was applied to 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976), another statute emanating from the
Organized Crime Control Act, in lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975). In response to
the defendant's attempt to restrict the interpretation of the language of that section, the Court
responded that the Act was "a carefully crafted piece of legislation. Had Congress intended [to
restrict the statute's application] . . . it would have so indicated explicitly [in its definition
section]." 420 U.S. at 789. Since this was not done, the Court determined that the statute should
be construed according to its express meaning. Id.
3 H.R. REPoTrr No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 56 (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4036.
13 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), af'd on other grounds, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975).
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
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pretation of the statutory language and held that the scope of section
1962(c) encompasses any form of the "perversion of legitimate business." 40 The defendants in Stofsky were union representatives who
were convicted of accepting illegal pay-offs in order to permit manufacturers to violate their collective bargaining agreement with the
unions by subcontracting work to non-union shops. 41 They contended that section 1962(c) was unconstitutionally vague. 42 The
particular phrase attacked and the issues raised were the same as those
examined by the Webster court: the meaning of "to conduct or participate ... in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern

of racketeering activity,"'' 43 and the interrelationship required be44
tween the operation of the enterprise and the racketeering activity.1
Stofsky and his codefendants argued that the statute failed to delineate whether or not the criminal acts must be in furtherance of, harmful to, vital to, or tangential to the usual operation of the business. 45
The court responded that it would be "futile" to argue that an individual committing a racketeering act as defined by section 1961(1) had
no knowledge or warning that his act was in violation of the law.14
All that is required to defeat this challenge to the statute is a finding
that reasonably intelligent persons would be put on notice that it is
unlawful to employ racketeering acts in the conduct of the affairs of a
business. 147 The court determined that this statute does sufficiently
warn people that their proscribed actions will be subject to indictment
and conviction.1

4
8

According to the Stofsky court, the statute, on its face, sets out
the requirement of a necessary connection between the racketeering
activities and the individual's participation in or control of the operations of the business.149 The statute does not specifically define the
role of the racketeering activity in the affairs of the enterprise, nor
does it require that those acts be in furtherance of the business. 50
110
Id.
14,
"'2

at 613.

id. at 611.
Id. at 612.

14318 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
'I 409 F. Supp. at 612.
145Id.
146

Id.

11 Id. at 613. Similar language appears in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
4' 409 F. Supp. at 613.
149 Id.

Is The court expanded on its decision by stating:
ld.
It is true that the statute does not define this connection by distinguishing between
predicate acts which play a major or a minor role, or any role at all, in what might
be seen as the usual operations of the enterprise; nor does it require that such acts be
in furtherance of the enterprise, as defendants suggest it must.
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The court stated that the reason Congress did not require benefit to
flow to the enterprise as part of the plain language of the statute was
because Congress never intended to limit the scope of the statute to
any particular type of perversion of an enterprise by racketeering. 5,
The Stofsky court interpreted the legislative intent and the language
of the statute as broad enough to attack all the forms that racketeering
influence and corruption can take.'5 2 If the goals of a business are
corrupted, or if the racketeering is conducted in a manner harmful to
the enterprise, that connection is actionable under RICO. 15 3 If the
racketeering benefits the legitimate goals of the enterprise, that conduct is reachable by RICO. 54 Or, if as in the Webster case, the
business maintains its legitimate goals as a front for unrelated racketeering activity, that conduct is within the broad sweep of the RICO
statutes. 15 The Stofsky court interpreted the legislative intent as
covering all of these influences and corruptions of business, not just
one of them, as the Webster court asserted in its restrictive interpretation of the statute. According to the Stofsky interpretation, the statute
plainly states that criminal liability will rest on those who corrupt an
enterprise in any form. 56 Since Congress did not intend to limit the
applicability of the statute, the court concluded that there was no
good reason to restrict RICO through a judicial determination which
would be at variance both with the legislative intent and with the
57
plain language of the statute.
The obiter dictum in the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in Turkette'5 8 seems to indicate that the Stofsky approach
may be adopted. In its determination that the term "enterprise" encompasses illegitimate as well as legitimate business, 5 9 the Court
"I Id. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922.23
(Statement of Findings and Purpose).
15 409 F. Supp. at 613.
153 Id.

154Id.
135Id.

Id.
13SId. This liberal interpretation set out in Stofsky has been followed in numerous other cases.
158

See, e.g., United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aJJ'd, 578 F.2d 1371, cert.
dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1977). In Field, the court asserted that no particular interrelationship
between the predicate acts and the enterprise is required by section 1962(c). Id. Nor does the
statute require that the state prove advancement of the enterprise by the racketeering activities.
Id. The only requirement in the statute is "that the government establish that the defendant's
acts were committed in the conduct of the [enterprise's] affairs." Id. Accord, United States v.
Swidersid, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v.
Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978); United States v. Scalzetti, 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D.
Pa. 1975); United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
1" 101 S. Ct. at 2524.
159Id. at 2527.
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reviewed the legislative history of RICO 160 and the canons of construction 161 relied on by the appellate court. Justice White, writing for

the majority, stated that a liberal construction was required 62 and
that the definition of the term "enterprise" 61 3 was unambiguous and
plain "on its face."164 In analyzing the Statement of Findings and

Purpose of OCCA, 65 the Court recognized the pervasiveness of the
problem Congress was attacking and the broad purposes of the

Act.'0 8 The Court found that a restrictive interpretation of RICO
was "unacceptable" because it would place large areas of racketeering
activity beyond RICO's substantive scope. 6 7 In dictum it stated that
to support a conviction under section 1962(c) only two elements need
be proven. The first is the existence of an enterprise. The second is the
presence of a connected pattern of racketeering, demonstrated simply
by proof of the requisite number of racketeering acts performed by the
participants in the enterprise. 6 8 The Court, however, never speci-

fied what connection must exist between the enterprise and the racketeering activity, thus leaving this issue open to interpretation by the
lower federal courts.
Although the Court was specifically addressing the definition of
an enterprise, which, as the Webster court pointed out, 69 was a
separate issue, the Supreme Court's reasoning should nonetheless be
'eo id. at 2531-34.
16 Id. at 2527-28. For a discussion of ejusdem generis, see note 48 supra. In an important
footnote, 101 S. Ct. at 2531 n.10, the Court also rejected the application of the rule of lenity, a

guide to statutory construction which requires a strict construction of criminal statutes and a
resolution of any ambiguity in favor of lenity. The Court stated that there was no ambiguity in
the statute. Also, the Court cited United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1948), which
stated that a strict construction should not "override common sense and evident statutory
purpose." 101 S. Ct. at 2531 n.10 (quoting Brown, 333 U.S. at 25). The meaning of the statute
need not be given its narrowest interpretation, only its "fair meaning in accord with the manifest
intent of the lawmakers." 333 U.S. at 26.
1 101 S. Ct. at 2531-32.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).

103

'°

101 S. Ct. at 2527.

"

Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23.
101 S.Ct. at 2531.

"6

187Id. at 2531-32.
I" Id. at 2528.

10 The Webster court clearly distinguished betweeh the issue of the definition of enterprise
and the issue of the interpretation of conducting the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering.
639 F.2d at 184 n.4. The court acknowledged the controversy of whether "enterprise" could
include both legitimate and illegitimate businesses and indicated the Fourth Circuit's agreement
with those decisions which included illegitimate enterprises within the scope of RICO. Id. The
court then explicitly stated that Webster did not involve that controversy. "Legal or illegal, the
1508 Club simply did not have its affairs conducted or promoted through a pattern of racketeering activity .
I.."
Id. Thus, the court determined that "there is no occasion here for us to address
the 'legal enterprise' v. 'illegal enterprise' issue." Id.
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applicable to the interpretation of the section 1962(c) phrase "to
participate

. . .

in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a

pattern of racketeering activity." 70 The words are plain on their
face; their meanings should be delineated by their common usage.
When an individual uses an enterprise in a pattern of racketeering,
that individual is subject to a conviction under RICO with all its
subsequent criminal and civil penalties.'17 That result is not "absurd," "inconsisten[t]," 72 "incongru[ous]," or "surprising." 173 The
Supreme Court might easily have been referring to the Webster
court's restrictive approach to section 1962(c) rather than to the
Turkette appellate court's restrictive approach to the definition of
enterprise when it said, "insulating the wholly criminal enterprise
74
from prosecution under RICO is the more incongruous position." 1
The fallacy of this appellate court position was pointed out by Justice
Rehnquist when, during argument before the Supreme Court, he
asked the Assistant Solicitor General, "The [appellate court's] theory
really was that these people were so totally illegal that they had to be
'
acquitted, right?"

75

In order to advance the recognized purpose of the RICO statute,
which is to eradicate racketeering in the United States, the Supreme
Court construed the language of RICO as plain on its face. A definition alien to that plain meaning and which would have restricted the
scope of the statute was rejected in Turkette. 176 There is no reason to
believe that the Supreme Court would not treat the words "conduct"
or "through" in the same manner in which it treated the definition of
"enterprise." It seems clear that the Court would apply the same
reasoning to Webster as it did in Turkette. It would reject the Webster
court's judicially created requirement of proof of a flow of benefit to
77
the corrupted enterprise from its associated racketeering activity.1
The Supreme Court is much more likely to follow the liberal construction expounded in Stofsky. To follow the restrictive definitions used in
Nerone or Webster would be to grant exactly that type of immunity to
racketeering criminals warned against by Justice Rehnquist.

78

When

Webster and Thompson used the premises, the telephones, the employees, and the inventory of the Club 1508 Tavern and Liquor Store
170 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).

17 Id. §§ 1963-1964.
172

101 S. Ct. at 2527. The court indicated that these results are to be avoided. Id.

173 Id.

Id.
Arguments Before the Court, United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981).
176 101 S. Ct. at 2527.
177 See 639 F.2d at 185.
178 See text accompanying note 175 supra.
174
173
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in their drug distribution network, 79 they committed an illegal act in
violation of section 1962(c). If Congress had intended to narrow the
scope of the statute to only those situations in which the enterprise was
benefited by the racketeering activity as argued by the Webster
court,180 it would have done so by stating that it would be unlawful
"to benefit such enterprise's affairs" rather than stating it is unlawful
"to conduct such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity." 181
In light of Turkette, the Stofsky analysis of RICO is the only
logical interpretation of both the language of the statute and the
legislative intent. The Webster court's determination that the statute
can be applied only against those racketeers who act illegally for the
purpose and effect of furthering the legitimate goals of a business
enterprise is a perversion of the purpose of the RICO statutes. Under
the Stofsky theory any individual who, in the conduct of a legitimate
business, uses racketeering activities either to further the business or to
further the criminal activity would be subject to prosecution, conviction, and the harsh penalties established in RICO. These consequences
for racketeering acts are the protective devices created by the law.
These safeguards of American commerce must not be destroyed.
RICO was designed as a two-way avenue of attack-what benefits an
enterprise through racketeering must be actionable, and what benefits
racketeering under cover of legitimate enterprise must be equally
actionable. To restrict that protection would be of value only to
criminals. The Webster decision grants an immunity based on legalistic hair-splitting, which permits criminals to invade commerce, corrupting and influencing, but certainly not benefiting American business.
Felice T. Londa
,71 639 F.2d at 183-84.
,s0 Id: at 185.
Is' 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court used similar reasoning
in Turkette when it stated that if the Congressional intent was to limit the statute as argued by
the court of appeals, "there would have been some positive sign" reflected in its choice of
language. 101 S. Ct. at 2533. As it is,,the statutory language, which the Court calls "the most
reliable evidence of [Congress'] intent, [demonstrates] that Congress opted for a far broader
definition of the word 'enterprise' . . . [which] should be given its full effect." Id.

